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ADDICTED TO MOTHERHOOD – A CAUTIONARY 
TALE 
 




The events in Re P  (Surrogacy: Residence) [2008] 1FLR 177, are of such 
complexity and involve so many people that the dramatis personae below 
may be necessary to help the reader understand the tangled tale of the woman 
whose maternal instinct can only be described as insatiable. 
  
• Mrs P - the 38 year old mother of five children all of whom had  
different fathers. 
• Mr P - her 52 year old husband and not the father of any of her  
children. He had 4 children, now adults from a previous 
relationship. 
• P  - Mrs P’s 20 year old son, father’s identity uncertain but  
either Mr MD or MA. 
• S      - Mrs P’s 19 year old daughter, father’s identity uncertain but  
possibly Mr G. She lived with her 1 year old child and her 
boyfriend. 
• T     - Mrs P’s 10 year old daughter, father’s identity unknown. 
• C       - Mrs P’s 6 year old daughter born of a surrogacy  
arrangement with Mr R. 
• N     - Mrs P’s 18 month old son born of a surrogacy arrangement  
with Mr J. 
• Mr J  - the commissioning father of N, aged 47, he had a 2 year old  
son (exactly 1 year older than N) born as a result of a 
surrogacy arrangement with another woman. 
• Mrs J     - Mr J’s wife, aged 50.   
• Mr R - the commissioning father of C. He had a 19 year old  
daughter from a previous relationship. 
• Mrs R - Mr R’s wife. 
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One can have nothing but sympathy for Coleridge J, in Re P, when faced 
with the difficult task of deciding the future of two children N and C, born by 
way of surrogacy agreements which went very badly wrong. The behaviour of 
their dysfunctional family stretches the imagination of even the most avid 
lover of television soap operas. The decision draws attention to the 
problematic, and unsatisfactory, nature of the law relating to surrogacy in 
England and Wales, and the potentially chaotic consequences for surrogates, 
commissioning parents, and the children born of surrogacy arrangements.  
The children’s mother, Mrs P, was a 38-year-old woman with an 
obsessive desire to procreate.  By the time the law intervened in her life, she 
had given birth to five children all by different fathers. She satisfied this 
desire by both fair means and foul, although the latter tended to dominate. 
Mrs P had a tendency to regard men as sperm donors, and was not a great 
believer in their ongoing role in her children’s lives. Prior to engaging in child 
production, she had worked as a prostitute and had been convicted for 
activities which form an essential part of this vocation. Mrs P also appeared 
unable to distinguish fact from fiction.  
After giving birth to her first two children, P and S, Mrs P began to 
cohabit with a man, who had four adult children of his own; he was aged 52 at 
the time of the court hearing. They lived on state benefits. The identities of the 
fathers of P and S were somewhat uncertain, and they played no part in the 
children’s lives. 
In the light of Mrs P’s addiction, her decision to live with the new man in 
her life was a rather bizarre because he was sterile after undergoing a 
successful vasectomy. She soon became desperate to acquire child number 
three, and fortuitously had read in the local newspaper about the abandonment 
of a newly born baby in Weston-super-Mare. She decided to invent a story in 
which she claimed that the baby was hers. To enable her to succeed in this 
plan, she voluntarily relinquished P and S, who were at the time aged one and 
two respectively, into the temporary care of the local social services 
department. She told the social workers that she felt unable to cope with them. 
A subsequent police investigation and a medical examination revealed that 
Mrs P could not be the abandoned baby’s mother. Mrs P promptly reclaimed 
S and P, and moved on to her next scheme to satiate her craving; in that she 
persuaded her cohabitee to undergo an operation to have the vasectomy 
reversed. Sadly for her, the surgery failed to restore his fertility.  
Undeterred in her ambition, Mrs P visited a licensed fertility clinic to 
investigate the possibility of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment by using 
sperm from an anonymous donor. Later, Mr P (as he had then become) lied to 
the court and said that they had gone to the clinic to offer to donate Mrs P’s 
eggs to help infertile couples. The clinic rejected her as unsuitable for 
infertility treatment on both social and medical grounds. Following this 
rejection, Mrs P regularly claimed to be pregnant and was admitted to hospital 




on several occasions. Each time she was discovered not to be. It could not be 
established with any certainty whether she had ever been pregnant or whether 
her claims were merely vain hopes. 
Mrs P decided that the next step in her constant search for an additional 
child was to achieve respectability by way of marriage to her cohabitant, and 
she and he duly became Mr and Mrs P.  The newlyweds put themselves 
forward as potential adoptive parents.  They expressed a preference for a child 
with Down’s Syndrome in spite of the fact that they were already 
overwhelmed by the needs of S who had Crohn’s Disease, cerebral venous 
thrombosis and suffered from psychotic episodes. In addition, P had autistic 
tendencies and severe behavioural difficulties. Their attempt to adopt was 
rapidly abandoned.  
When P was aged 9, Mrs P finally achieved her aim, and gave birth to a 
daughter, T. Not surprisingly her father was unknown. Mr and Mrs P were 
adamant that she was their biological daughter, hardly a credible claim in the 
light of Mr P’s sterility. They maintained that it was outrageous and 
scandalous for anyone to imply that Mrs P could possibly have committed 
adultery with another man. Nevertheless, Mr P refused to undergo DNA 
testing to establish his fatherhood. T was investigated for a mild form of 
cerebral palsy but was found to be healthy. Mrs P refused to accept the 
diagnosis and proceeded to collect a disability allowance on behalf of T, and 
convinced herself and inculcated the rest of the family with the belief that the 
child did indeed have the condition. Not only did Mrs P want children, she 
preferred sick children; they brought attention for her, as well as an increase 
in state benefits. 
Three children did not satisfy Mrs P; she needed more. An organisation 
known as COTS (Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy) came to her 
attention. She offered to put her name on its register as a prospective surrogate 
mother. She was put in touch with Mr and Mrs R who had approached COTS 
for help; they were desperate to have a baby because their 19 year old 
daughter was an only child. An agreement was negotiated. Mrs P would be 
impregnated with Mr R’s sperm by means of IVF treatment in return for a fee 
of £850 to cover the pregnancy and birth expenses. She rapidly became 
pregnant but early on in the pregnancy, Mr P telephoned Mr R and informed 
him that Mrs P could not complete on the deal because she had miscarried. He 
also told Mr R that Mrs P was not prepared to try again and wanted no further 
contact with him and his wife. Mr and Mrs R were devastated; they had no 
idea that Mr P was lying, and only learned four years later that the pregnancy 
had resulted in the birth of a baby girl, C, who was subsequently found to 
have a speech disorder which required therapy. Mr and Mrs P failed to keep 
appointments arranged with a speech therapist, and, as a consequence, C 






                                                     
Three years after C’s birth, Mrs P began the search for her next child and 
after an abortive attempt to foster another Down's Syndrome child, she 
returned to COTS. Given that COTS knew about the supposed miscarriage, 
Mrs P had to overcome the problem of explaining C’s existence. However, 
over the years, she had become an expert in fabrication. She told the agency 
that she had become pregnant with C very soon after the miscarriage and that 
Mr P was the father of C.  Her story was believed, and COTS put her in touch 
with Mr and Mrs J who already had a baby born as a result of an earlier 
successful surrogacy arrangement made via COTS. An agreement was signed 
and Mrs P was impregnated with Mr J’s sperm at a licensed fertility clinic.  
Soon after, she telephoned Mr and Mrs J and explained to them that their 
arrangement had come to an unfortunate end because she had miscarried. Her 
deception was almost successful but fate intervened.  
A few months before Mrs P gave birth to Mr J’s son, N, an explosive 
family row occurred between Mrs P and S. The pair had always had a very 
stormy mother and daughter relationship. S had not only suffered from 
physical illnesses but had also had many psychological and emotional 
problems throughout her life. She had been depressed and suicidal (and had 
self-harmed). The side effects of her medication had led to several psychotic 
episodes. Her mother had also led her to believe that she was registered blind 
and would ultimately be confined to a wheelchair. At the age of 19, S left 
home and went to live with a man whom she had met on the internet, and 
gave birth to a baby boy. To avenge her mother, S blew the whistle and 
telephoned COTS to let them know that Mrs P had cheated both Mr R and Mr 
J by lying about her miscarriages. By way of retaliation, Mrs P reported S to 
social services. She maintained that S was a serious danger to her baby. She 
also claimed that S, at one point, had attempted to smother C, and had taken a 
knife to school to harm another pupil. None of this was true but that did not 
deter this expert in mendacity; she added to the list of S’s supposed 
misdemeanours the even wilder, and false, allegation that S was the surrogate 
mother of Mr and Mrs J’s first child.   
S’s whistle blowing led Mr R to discover the existence of his 4 year-old 
daughter C, and Mr J to discover that Mrs P was about to give birth to N. Mr 
R immediately applied to the court for orders under the Children Act 1989.1 
He wanted C to be told about her paternity and for him to be awarded an order 
for contact. . At first, Mr and Mrs P maintained that they had continued to 
have a sexual relationship during the IVF treatment with Mr R and that C was 
their child. They reluctantly changed their minds after DNA tests showed 
otherwise. They agreed with Mr R that they would eventually tell C of her 
true paternity and would also allow him to have an ongoing visiting 
relationship with her. Somewhat surprisingly, given past history, Mr R 
1 (see ss 1, 8, 10).  




                                                     
believed that Mr and Mrs P would keep their word this time, and decided to 
withdraw his application for contact and the matter proceeded consensually.  
Nonetheless, the court decided that C should be made a ward of court which 
would allow C to be involved in all important future decisions about her life. 
The court also decided that all contact should be monitored by social services. 
Mr and Mrs J took a very different stance. On learning Mrs P had not 
miscarried, they disregarded Mr and Mrs P’s denial that Mrs P was still 
pregnant; the birth of N soon put paid to that particular lie. They also ignored 
Mr and Mrs P’s claims that N was Mr P’s biological child, and applied to the 
court for a residence order under the Children Act 1989 which would deliver 
N into their care. Their application and the necessary DNA testing to establish 
N’s paternity took some time to be resolved, and by the date of the final 
hearing N was 18 months old. He had bonded with Mr and Mrs P and his 
siblings. However, it was also clear that the beginnings of a relationship 
between Mr and Mrs J and N had been established.  At an earlier court 
hearing, the judge had ordered that they should be allowed to meet with N, 
every three weeks for one hour. These meetings, much against Mr and Mrs 
P’s wishes, and sometimes without their cooperation, had gone on for six 
months and had been supervised by social services at a contact centre.  
In the light of N’s age, Coleridge J’s task in deciding his future was not an 
easy one. He began his judgment by acknowledging that surrogacy 
arrangements are a mixed blessing.  
 
“When all goes according to plan, they are a way of remedying the 
agony of childlessness. However, when the arrangements do not go 
according to plan the result, in human and legal terms is, putting it 
simply, a mess.”2
 
He could well have added that the law relating to surrogacy (discussed 
below) is itself a mess. He recognised that it was both understandable and 
natural for a surrogate mother to change her mind about giving up the child, 
which had been in her womb for nine months, and to whom she had given 
birth. However, he found that Mrs P had not merely changed her mind but had 
embarked on a deliberate, cruel and inhuman plan to trick two men, both 
desperate to have a child, into parting with their sperm. She had raised the 
expectations of them and their wives knowing that she and her husband had 
no intention other than to keep the children. The police had actually 
investigated the couple with a view to criminal prosecution but had decided 
not to proceed further. This deception was not, in itself, a sufficient reason to 
remove N from the only family he had ever known. The only question the 





                                                     
court had to ask itself, in accordance with the Children Act 1989, s.1, was 
which parents would secure N’s best interests.  In Coleridge J’s words,  
 
“… the test here is a simpler one to formulate, though not necessarily 
to answer; namely, as between the two competing residential care 
regimes on offer from the two parents (with their respective spouses) 
and available for his upbringing, which, after considering all aspects 
of the two options, is the one most likely to deliver the best outcome 
for him over the course of his childhood and in the end be most 
beneficial. Put very simply, in which home is he most likely to mature 
into a happy and balanced adult and to achieve his fullest potential as 
a human? The fact that both families constitute one of the child’s 
natural parents means that both sides start from the same position, 
neither side being able to claim that the blood tie should favour their 
claim.”3
 
He emphasised that his decision did not involve penalising Mr and Mrs P 
for breaking their agreement and deceiving the commissioning parents. 
However, he acknowledged that their devious behaviour was relevant 
evidence in determining whether they or Mr and Mrs J would make suitable 
parents for N and should be balanced alongside all the other aspects of their 
conduct. He listened carefully to the statements from consultant 
paediatricians, social workers as well as lawyers about Mr and Mrs P’s 
parenting skills which were surprisingly ambivalent.  Several of them were 
quite positive. One health visitor had expressed shock that there was any 
problem with this ‘lovely’ family who had lots of toys in the house and who 
had a loving relationship with N. Other experts drew attention to the 
devastation which would be suffered by N in the immediate future if he were 
to go to live with Mr and Mrs J, 200 miles away from Mr and Mrs P, the only 
parents he had ever known. How would they be able to continue to remain in 
contact with him at such a distance? It would be difficult, impractical and 
unaffordable for a couple living on welfare benefits to travel to visit him. To 
disturb the strong familial bonds, which N had developed over 18 months 
with his parents and siblings, was not to be undertaken lightly. Why not leave 
N with Mr and Mrs P? After all they had agreed to let Mr and Mrs J see him 
on a regular basis. 
To resolve the appalling dilemma which faced him, the judge centred his 
decision on the need for honesty and trustworthiness in parents. The opposing 
characteristics of lies and unreliability, which Mr and Mrs P had demonstrated 
in abundance, were hardly appropriate skills for parenting. They lied about 
everything; their distortions of the truth were unsurpassable. Not only had 
3 Re P (Surrogacy: Residence) [2008] 1 FLR 177.  




                                                     
they deceived the commissioning parents, they had lied to their own children 
about their medical problems, they had lied about their eldest daughter’s 
treatment of her baby, they had lied about the identities of the fathers of their 
children, and they had lied about their reasons for visiting an IVF clinic. 
Indeed, the only matter they did not lie about was the possibility that Mrs P 
might decide to continue to satisfy her emotionally dysfunctional addiction 
and have another baby. She actually admitted to the judge that this was a 
possibility. According to Coleridge J, Mr and Mrs P,  
 
“… were often incapable of distinguishing fact from fiction and that 
they did indeed take grains of truth and amplify and distort them into 
unrecognisable factual conclusions. In the end I think they are 
prepared to make it up as they go along … on occasions they were 
hardly conscious of the extent to which they were fabricating.”4
 
The Judge was convinced that Mr and Mrs P, in spite of their claims to be 
willing about ongoing contact, were likely to be grudging and would very 
likely sabotage it.  He saw no hope of a change in Mrs P in the near future; 
her problems were deep rooted and stemmed from her early life experiences 
which only extensive psychotherapy could possibly resolve. 
Mr and Mrs J, on the other hand, he considered to be quiet, intelligent, 
good, decent and honest people. He was a middle-income architect, and she 
had given up her professional career as an urban planner to become a full-time 
mother. They accepted ongoing contact between N and Mr and Mrs P and his 
siblings as crucially important to his balanced development. They felt that N 
would have a need to understand what had happened and that they would seek 
counselling to help them all to cope with it.  
Coleridge J’s decision, although undoubtedly correct, showed a certain 
lack of insight into the effect of separation on an 18-month-old child from the 
only parents and family he had ever known. He suggested that although a 
move would cause N short-term distress, probably for a period of about two 
months, he should be placed immediately with Mr and Mrs J on a long-term 
basis in order that his best interests be met in the future. N would be made a 
ward of court to allow his development to be monitored. The judge’s words 
show an amazing optimism in the light of all that had gone before 
 
“If all sides put N’s best interests above their own and move on, 
preferably with the help of a child psychologist there is every reason 
to be cautiously optimistic that N will be able to benefit fully from 
input in his life from both his biological families.”5
4 Re P (Surrogacy: Residence) [2008] 1 FLR 177. 





                                                     
 
An immediate appeal against Coleridge J’s decision was made by Mr and 
Mrs P to the Court of Appeal; it was rejected. 
The decision in Re P draws attention yet again to the problematic nature 
of the law relating to surrogacy in England and Wales.6 It is law which is 
half-hearted and piecemeal; it gives conflicting messages, inter alia, engage in 
surrogacy at your peril, but the law will not protect you or your child if 
arrangements go wrong. There is ample evidence for this view.  
First, surrogacy arrangements are legal but unenforceable under the 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 s. S.1A. If women like Mrs P renege on 
the agreement, the commissioning parents are in a difficult position. The 
surrogate mother, like all birth mothers, automatically acquires parental rights 
and obligations, along with her husband, or civil partner, if there is one, and 
who has agreed to the surrogacy arrangement. These rights and obligation 
include the right to have the child reside with her and her husband, or civil 
partner, and make all the decisions about the child’s everyday care. The 
commissioning parent can only obtain parental rights and obligations by 
applying to the court for an order under the Children Act 1986, or by adoption 
of the child. This means that the majority of surrogate mothers who wish to 
keep their children will normally be allowed to do. By the time any dispute 
comes to court, most children will have reached an age where bonding has 
taken place and few judges will view it as in a child’s best interest to destroy 
that bond. The court in Re P was exceptional in being prepared to take that 
risk. If the commissioning parents renege on the agreement, the surrogate 
mother and her husband, or civil partner, will find themselves responsible for 
the child.7  
Second, under s.2 of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, no one may 
engage in the negotiation of surrogacy arrangements for a fee. The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s.59 has amended this section in a 
fairly convoluted manner and now allows organisations which provide 
surrogacy services on a not- for- profit basis to receive payment for providing 
some of those services. They may make a reasonable charge, for example, to 
enable surrogate mothers and commissioning parents/ parties to meet each 
other to discuss the possibility of a surrogacy arrangement between them. 
They may also charge for compiling information about surrogacy and 
establishing and keeping lists of people willing to be a surrogate mother, or 
commission such a person. They may not, however charge for offering to 
negotiate a surrogacy arrangement or for taking part in negotiations about a 
surrogacy arrangement. They may, however, undertake them legally if they do 
not charge for them. They may now also advertise those activities for which 
6 See also Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2009] 1 FLR 733. 
7 Re P (Surrogacy: Residence) [2008] 1 FLR 177. 




                                                     
they are allowed to charge. So, they may advertise that they hold lists of 
surrogate mothers and commissioning parents and that it may bring them 
together for discussion. But it will remain illegal for anyone to advertise that 
they seek a surrogate mother or wish to be a surrogate mother.  Unlike fertility 
clinics, which are regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority and governed by the provisions of the HFEA 1990, or adoption 
agencies which must be registered, there have been no further attempts to 
monitor these facilitating surrogacy organisations. They remain self-
regulating and most make serious efforts to do this well. Coleridge J’s final 
comments in Re P were reserved for these organisations which play a major 
role in surrogacy. He suggested, with a certain lack of force, that some 
surrogate mothers might have psychological difficulties relating to their own 
unacknowledged and unmet needs. Background checks on all potential 
surrogates and commissioning parents should be a priority for surrogacy 
organisations. Perhaps, he should have gone further and suggested that it is 
only by well thought out regulation that there will be an end to the risk of the 
type of chaos and emotional pain which occurred in Re P.8
Third, surrogate mothers may not receive any payments from the 
commissioning parents other than for costs associated with pregnancy and 
birth expenses yet the courts retrospectively authorise payments which are 
clearly unreasonable (see Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy).9  
Fourth, the HFEA 1990 (as amended) whilst not actually regulating 
surrogacy makes provision for parental orders under s.30. These orders 
transfer all the parental rights and obligations to the commissioning parent or 
couple provided the application is made to the court within six months of the 
child’s birth. At least one of the commissioning couple must have provided 
gametes used to create the child. The surrogate mother, and her husband, or 
civil partner, if they have agreed to the surrogacy must consent to the making 
of any parental order. The surrogate mother may not give her consent until six 
weeks after the birth of the child. Where there is agreement but the other 
conditions are not met, the commissioning parent/s will have no recourse 
other than to apply for an order under the Children Act 1989 or apply to adopt 
the child.  
Since 1985, when surrogacy first came within the ambit of the law, it has 
developed as an alternative to adoption or as an alternative form of infertility 
treatment. More recently, it has taken on an international dimension as 
commissioning parents seek surrogate mothers abroad. The law has failed to 
address these developments and rather, concentrated all its attention on other 
forms of infertility treatment. 
  
8 Re P (Surrogacy: Residence) [2008] 1 FLR 177. 





                                                     
Natalie Gamble and Louisa Ghevaert who are lawyers specialising in 
fertility law have stated that: 
 
“We need a better and more planned approach to surrogacy. Of 
course, there are difficult and sensitive issues to be handled in creating 
new law. Surrogacy arrangements are among the most ethically and 
humanly complex in assisted reproduction, with three or even four 
adults involved throughout the process of conception, pregnancy and 
birth, and possibly third party gamete donors as well. The respective 
interests, protection and independence from exploitation of all these 
adults and, most importantly, the resulting child, need to be 
adequately balanced and protected by the law.”10  
 
I can only concur.not illegal in the UK but it is restricted b 
10 http://www.bionews.org.uk/BioNews  
